Free Theodore Roosevelt by Louis Auchincloss Page B

finally gave in, dropping all claim for an indemnity, and a treaty was concluded. Roosevelt in 1906 was deservedly awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. He accepted it gladly, but gave the money, forty thousand dollars, to a committee for industrial peace, writing to one of his sons:
    I hate to do anything foolish or quixotic, and above all I hate to do anything that means the refusal of money which would ultimately come to you children. But Mother and I talked it over and came to the conclusion that while I was President, at any rate, and perhaps anyhow, I could not accept money given to me for making peace between two nations, especially since I was able to make peace simply because I was President.
    TR’s troubles with Japan were not concluded by the treaty. Even while it was being negotiated he had to face Japanese anger at the treatment of their emigrants in California. He never had patience with discrimination of any kind, but he found himself severely handicapped, as he did in the southern states that virtually disenfranchised the Negro by the limits of federal power in what were then deemed essentially state matters. One thing he could do, in view of the rise of the Japanese menace in the Pacific, was build up the navy, and this he did, making large annual demands of Congress. In 1908, for example, he requested authority to build four battleships, knowing the number would be halved, which it was, but also knowing it was the only way to get the needed two. In all he increased the navy from fifth in the world in size to second only to Britain’s, with a total of twenty battleships, and in his second term he sent “the great white fleet” around the world to impress the powers that the United States was in a position to back up its word.
    It was natural for him at times to express his exasperation at how much violent push was needed to persuade Americans to protect themselves, as when he wrote: “Most certainly the Japs are a wonderful people. I feel rather bitterly when I compare what they have done with the howling and whooping and yelling of our own people against even a moderate increase in our navy.” And in 1908 he wrote: “I do not believe that there will be war with Japan, but I do believe there is enough chance of war to make it eminently wise to secure against it by building such a navy as to forbid Japan’s hope for success. I happen to know that the Japanese military party is inclined for war with us and is not only confident of success, but confident that they could land a large expeditionary force in California and conquer all of the United States west of the Rockies. I fully believe that in the end they would pay dearly for this.”
    He was not only concerned with the present status of the navy but was keenly concerned with its future. He went down on an early dive of the USS Plunger, one of our first submarines: “I went down in it chiefly because I didn’t like to have the officers and enlisted men think I wanted them to try things I was reluctant to try myself. I believe a good deal can be done with these submarines, although there is always the danger of people getting carried away with the idea and thinking that they can be more use than they possibly could be.”
    Trouble in the Caribbean offered TR several opportunities to develop a new and wider concept of the Monroe Doctrine. When a Latin American nation defaulted in its financial obligations to one of the greater European powers, it had become an accepted remedy for the creditor country to send warships to intimidate and sometimes actually bombard the debtor nation. This was the case with Venezuela and Germany in 1902, but Roosevelt made it clear to the German ambassador that he would order Admiral Dewey to make sure that Germany did not take possession of any Venezuelan territory. When the ambassador gravely asked if the president realized the possible consequences of such an order, TR later claimed: “I