Free The battle for Spain: the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939 by Antony Beevor Page B

the right to create alliances had the effect of emptying the centre ground.
    Any possibility of compromise had been destroyed by the revolutionary uprising of the left and its cruel repression by the army and Civil Guard. The depth of feeling was too strong on either side to allow democracy to work. Both sides used apocalyptic language, funnelling the expectations of their followers towards a violent outcome, not a political one. Largo Caballero declared, ‘If the right win the elections, we will have to go straight to open civil war.’ 1 Not surprisingly, the right reacted with a similar attitude. In their view a left-wing victory in the polls was bound to lead to violent revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat which Largo Caballero had promised.
    The main group on the right was basically an alliance of the CEDA with monarchists and Carlists of the National Block. José María Gil Robles, the CEDA leader, called it ‘the national counter-revolutionary front’. 2 Gil Robles, whose Catholic corporatism had acquired some superficial fascist trappings, allowed himself to be acclaimed by his followers at mass meetings as the leader, with the cry ‘ Jefe, jefe, jefe!’ . (The Spanish for ‘chief’ was an amateurish imitation of ‘ Duce!’ or ‘ Führer!’ .) His advertising for the campaign included a massive poster covering the façade of a building in central Madrid with the slogan: ‘Give me an absolute majority and I will give you a great Spain.’ Millions of leaflets were distributed saying that a victory for the left would produce ‘an arming of the mob, the burning of banks and private houses, the division of property and land, looting and the sharing out of your women’. 3 The finance for such a campaign came from landowners, large companies and the Catholic Church, which hurried to bless the alliance with the idea that a vote for the right was a vote for Christ.
    Since the proclamation of the Republic in April 1931, with the subsequent burning of churches and convents and the anti-clerical provisions in the Constitution, the Catholic hierarchy had already demonstrated its hostility. But the rising of October 1934 had pushed it into advocating disobedience to a legally constituted government if it were necessary to protect the interests of the Church. When the Republic suppressed the state subsidy the Church had soon found itself impoverished, and its priests depended even more on contributions from their parishioners. 4
    In 1936 Spain had some 30,000 priests, most of whom were poor and very uneducated, incapable of any other employment. The hierarchy, however, was jealous of its privileges. When Cardinal Vidal y Barraquer, faced with the Church’s financial crisis, proposed that the richer dioceses should help the poorer ones, most of the bishops objected furiously. 5
    On 15 January 1936 the parties of the centre-left and left signed a pact to contest the elections as a single group. 6 A Popular Front programme was drafted, concentrating mainly on agrarian reform, the re-establishment of the Catalan statute of autonomy and an amnesty for the prisoners in Spain arrested after the October revolution. 7 Nothing was said about nationalization of banks or division of the land, but the right claimed that there were secret clauses in the pact. 8 This was a natural suspicion in the circumstances. The Popular Front election manifesto was indeed mild, yet the caballeristas had already called for the nationalization of the land, the dissolution of the army, Civil Guard and all religious orders with seizure of their property. In May 1935 the manifesto of the Alianza Obrera had called in addition for ‘confiscation and nationalization of large industry, finance, transportation and communications’. 9
    The proposal to free all those sentenced for taking part in a violent rebellion against the legally elected government of the day was bound to provoke the right. In fact, the open determination of the left as