in the
construction ofEmpire. Ifwe were to remain within the conceptual
framework of classic domestic and international law, we might be
B I O P O L I T I C A L P R O D U C T I O N
39
tempted to say that a supranational quasi-state is being formed. That
does not seem to us, however, an accurate characterization ofthe
situation. When the royal prerogatives ofmodern sovereignty re-
appear in Empire, they take on a completely different form. For
example, the sovereign function of deploying military forces was
carried out by the modern nation-states and is now conducted by
Empire, but, as we have seen, the justification for such deployments
now rests on a state ofpermanent exception, and the deployments
themselves take the form of police actions. Other royal prerogatives
such as carrying out justice and imposing taxes also have the same
kind ofliminal existence. We have already discussed the marginal
position ofjudicial authority in the constitutive process ofEmpire,
and one could also argue that imposing taxes occupies a marginal
position in that it is increasingly linked to specific and local urgen-
cies. In effect, one might say that the sovereignty of Empire itself
is realized at the margins, where borders are flexible and identities
are hybrid and fluid. It would be difficult to say which is more
important to Empire, the center or the margins. In fact, center
and margin seem continually to be shifting positions, fleeing any
determinate locations. We could even say that the process itselfis
virtual and that its power resides in the power ofthe virtual.
One could nonetheless object at this point that even while
being virtual and acting at the margins, the process ofconstructing
imperial sovereignty is in many respects very real! We certainly do
not mean to deny that fact. Our claim, rather, is that we are dealing
here with a special kind ofsovereignty—a discontinuous form of
sovereignty that should be considered liminal or marginal insofar
as it acts ‘‘in the final instance,’’ a sovereignty that locates its only
point ofreference in the definitive absoluteness ofthe power that
it can exercise. Empire thus appears in the form of a very high tech
machine: it is virtual, built to control the marginal event, and
organized to dominate and when necessary intervene in the break-
downs ofthe system (in line with the most advanced technologies
ofrobotic production). The virtuality and discontinuity ofimperial
sovereignty, however, do not minimize the effectiveness of its force;
40
T H E P O L I T I C A L C O N S T I T U T I O N O F T H E P R E S E N T
on the contrary, those very characteristics serve to reinforce its
apparatus, demonstrating its effectiveness in the contemporary his-
torical context and its legitimate force to resolve world problems
in the final instance.
We are now in the position to address the question whether,
on the basis ofthese new biopolitical premises, the figure and the
life of Empire can today be grasped in terms of a juridical model.
We have already seen that this juridical model cannot be constituted
by the existing structures ofinternational law, even when under-
stood in terms ofthe most advanced developments ofthe United
Nations and the other great international organizations. Their elabo-
rations ofan international order could at the most be recognized
as a process oftransition toward the new imperial power. The
constitution ofEmpire is being formed neither on the basis ofany
contractual or treaty-based mechanism nor through any federative
source. The source ofimperial normativity is born ofa new machine,
a new economic-industrial-communicative machine—in short, a
globalized biopolitical machine. It thus seems clear that we must
look at something other than what has up until now constituted
the bases ofinternational order, something that does not rely on
the form of right that, in the most diverse traditions, was grounded
in the