Free Hitler's Jet Plane by Mano Ziegler Page A

the aircraft was suitable for use as a fighter bomber. Three weeks later at Insterburg Hitler enquired of Messerschmitt about the aircraft’s bomb-carrying capability and he used the term ‘Blitzbomber’ specifically. Rust and Hess then continue:
Hitler saw the Me 262 as a Blitzbomber. He did not realize that converting the Me 262 into an effective two-seater bomber aircraft with the necessary bomb-aiming apparatus and bomb-release gear, not to mention adequate range, involved completely redesigning the aircraft. A conversion of this kind would have put back the operational readiness of the Me 262 by many months – certainly beyond when the invasion was expected.
    This assumption by Rust and Hess seems to go a little too far, for being informed of all the complaints about the Messerschmitt set-up and their causes, Hitler had Goering issue an order of the day on 5 December 1943 to the effect that:
The Führer wishes to draw our attention urgently to the enormous importance of the production of jet aircraft to be deployed as fighter bombers. It is imperative to ensure that by the spring of 1944 the Luftwaffe has a sufficient number of these fighter bombers operational. Any difficulties caused by raw-material and manpower shortages are to be overcome by the transfer of Luftwaffe supplies and personnel so that anything which might lead to a prolongation of the manufacturing period is removed. The Führer makes it known that all delays in our jet-fighter programme will be tantamount to irresponsible negligence. The Führer requires that with effect from 15 November 1943 a written report is submitted to him every two months regarding the current progress on the Me 262 and Ar 234 programmes.
    This order, though not the result of Goering’s visit to Augsburg, signified the final classification of the Me 262 as a fighter bomber and not the pure fighter which Messerschmitt had constructed and which the German fighter arm needed so desperately. After the loss of North Africa, the end of the alliance with Italy and the shrinking perimeter of the various fronts, the most powerful weapons of attack were now necessary on land and in the air to defend against the enemy. One of these weapons would have been the Me 262 fighter.
    The only plausible reason why Messerschmitt might want to protect himself against a full-scale production run of the Me 262, or at least to defer it, lay elsewhere.
    The fantastic success of the Me 109 had made Willy Messerschmitt into a celebrity worldwide. Its victories in 1939 and 1940 had endowed the machine with a kind of mystique. For its builder and his factory it brought almost a monopoly on fighter production confirmed semi-officially in a conversation between Udet and Ernst Heinkel reported in the latter’s memoir Stürmisches Leben .
    Heinkel, whose doubtlessly more efficient He 112 had been completed a little later than Messerschmitt’s Bf 109, must have been bitterly disappointed to lose out when in 1936/1937 the Bf 109 was chosen for the standard German fighter. A year or so later Heinkel observed to Udet, with whom he was on the friendliest terms, ‘The next fighter is Heinkel’s!’ Udet demurred. ‘The official view now is that aircraft manufacturers should specialise in particular types. It is a rationalisation. On account of his success with the Bf 109, Messerschmitt will take over the fighters. And, after the He 111, you will develop only bombers. The Bf 109 will keep us going for at least four years. It will soon have the 1000-hp Daimler – Benz engine. That will give it about 550 kph, and with the improved version, 600. Meanwhile Messerschmitt is working on a new twin-engined fighter. We have no more fighter problems...’
    Nobody could then have anticipated how heavy a cross to bear this last sentence would later become. No wonder therefore that Messerschmitt might feel as though his back were to the wall when the Me 209 and Me 309, successors to the Me 109 in 1942 and 1943, both drew