Free Qatar: Small State, Big Politics by Mehran Kamrava Page B

twenty-first century? Does power, even in its subtle variety, not require strength and stability within?
    Here the argument becomes somewhat problematic since agency, that unpredictable variable of human actions and initiatives, becomes a far more consequential factor than the role of circumstances and institutions. There can be no doubt that in Qatar and elsewhere in the Arabian Peninsula monarchy as an institution—as an integral part of the social fabric—will continue to be on solid grounds for decades to come. Since the mid-1990s, one of the biggest distinguishing factors about the Qatari monarchy has been the acumen, determination, and savvy of the current monarch, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani. Driven and ambitious, Hamad has been a master-balancer, successfully striking multiple balances between domestic, regional, and international actors while steadily enhancing his own, and his country’s, position. Whether the next monarch can have the same drive and determination, the same uncanny ability to position himself at the apex of an uncontested domestic power structure and the country as a regional leader and a global player is an open question. The heir apparent, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, has so far remained largely in the shadow of his father. All indications are that the emir and the heir apparent see eye-to-eye on matters of policy and direction. But the son remains as yet untested. Nevertheless, in chapters 4 through 6 I make the case that Hamad has positioned both the institution of the monarchy and Qatar’s international profile in such ways that even a less capable or ambitious heir cannot significantly lessen the country’s international influence or slow the pace of its upward ascent.
    A Snapshot of Qatar
    At first glance, it is easy to dismiss Qatar and most of the other countries of the Arabian Peninsula. Many in the Arab world sarcastically dismiss the small states of the Arabian Peninsula as “oil well states” ( al-dawla al-bi’r ), pointing to their need to incorporate the word “state” into their formal name as an indication of their self-doubt as viable states. 1 Even scholars have long neglected Qatar, with only a few articles and an odd book here or there published on the country well into the 1990s. 2 Even today, despite the belated realization of the country’s growing international significance, there are still no more than a handful of serious treatments on Qatar’s domestic and international politics. 3 Of late a promising cadre of younger scholars have pointed to the growing strategic and commercial significance of the Persian Gulf. Still, Qatar itself remains largely below the scholarly radar, frequently overlooked by observers of the region in favor of its larger or more troubled neighbors—the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, or Bahrain.
    Well into the twenty-first century, like the rest of the states of the GCC, Qatar continues to “struggle for self-definition and redefinition.” 4 Part of the problem with visibility and recognition has been the country’s small geographic and demographic size. With a landmass of only 4,416 square miles, Qatar is one of the smallest countries in the Middle East, second only to Bahrain with 274 square miles. The country also has the second smallest population base in the Middle East. According to the latest national census, in 2010 Qatar had a total population of 1.74 million. 5 Although the census does not distinguish between nationals and nonnationals, expatriates are estimated to make-up approximately 85 percent of all individuals living in the country. That means Qatari nationals number somewhere in the neighborhood of 250,000. Of these, some 10,000 to 15,000 are thought to be members of the extended ruling Al Thani family.
    Despite claims by members of the ruling family that the country’s origins date back to the Phoenicians, there is little archeological evidence to suggest that Doha was much more than a dusty and