Free Target: Rabaul by Bruce Gamble Page B

He had several pressing concerns to deal with in Brisbane, including the enemy’s continued development of Wewak. In response to the Central Agreement issued by Tokyo, the Japanese were busily improving the airfields and harbor facilities. Wewak would eventually house the largest Japanese garrison on New Guinea. Navy presence, while comparatively small, included a base force and the civil administration, plus a seaplane facility on nearby Kairiru Island.
    The main strength of the Wewak complex was its four army airfields. In addition to the original grass strip, which had been extensively improved, a second airfield was constructed about three miles to the east at Boram. Thirty miles to the northwest were two airfields that took their names from nearby villages: But and Dagua. In addition, there was a small emergency field near Cape Wom. Heavily defended with antiaircraft guns and fighters, the complex was becoming a real thorn for the Allies.
    Meanwhile, the Allies were developing their own airfield complex on a coastal plain south of Buna. The airstrip at Dobodura, bulldozed during the Papuan campaign in late 1942, was proving to be a valuable acquisition. It was more than a hundred miles closer to the enemy’s bases than Port Moresby was, which saved time and fuel. The aircrews no longer had to cross the treacherous Owen Stanley Mountains on their way to and from assigned targets, and that saved lives. “Dobodura is the most valuable airdrome site of the whole lot,” Kenney wrote onApril 13. “It is an ideal place in which to build airdromes from the viewpoint of speed in getting them constructed, and it is admirably located for all our operations except those directed at Buin-Faisi.”
    During an inspection of Dobodura, Kenney was pleased to find the main field abuzz with activity. He counted five additional airstrips in various stages of completion, but the construction battalions were facing a major problem. The nearest harbor facilities were at Oro Bay, more than fifty miles distant; virtually all materials had to be flown in. A supply road was under construction, but the engineers faced nightmarish challenges as they cut through swamps and coastal jungle. Frustrated by the slow progress of the road, Kenney was eager to see “Dobo” become a more vital asset.
    Kenney had another concern that made the issues with Dobodura and Wewak seem minor. Having warned MacArthur that the pipeline of new air groups and planes would not open up soon, Kenney was alarmed by the rate of attrition in his air units. Few losses were attributable to combat, causing Kenney to fear that his Allied air units were “going down fast.” Out of three U.S. Army fighter groups, he considered himself fortunate to count seventy-five aircraft available at any given time, equating to only a third of the groups’ nominal strength. Literally scraping the barrel, Kenney arranged for the last three fighters in Australia—a disabled P-39 and two damaged P-40s—to be repaired, armed, and sent to New Guinea.
    The bomb groups fared slightly better, with about two-thirds availability. On the evening of his return from New Guinea, Kenney met with MacArthur and explained how he planned to conserve the strength on hand, striking only when a good target presented itself, and by continuing the policy of not scheduling daylight raids if the target was beyond the range of fighter escort. MacArthur approved.
    The month of April closed with more bad news for Kenney. Another of his favorites was lost in a crash, this one even more preventable than the others. Earlier in the year, Kenney had entrusted the first squadron of modified B-25s to Edward L. Larner, then a captain, who simultaneously assumed command of the 90th Bomb Squadron, 3rd Attack Group. Larner had gotten Kenney’s attention while flying A-20s in the 89th Bomb Squadron, where he had earned a Silver Star for his aggressive style of attacking targets at low level. Larner was fond of showing off,