Free Target: Rabaul by Bruce Gamble

on that Jap show, and we would really have made a killing.”
    Anticipating that Milne Bay would be attacked the next day, April 13, Kenney and Wurtsmith arranged their defenses accordingly. But Kenney also kept an adequate number of fighters near Port Moresby. Throughout the morning and early afternoon of the 13th, the fighter groups waited for the early warning network to report an inbound attack. But nothing happened. Later that afternoon, reconnaissance planes reported bad weather from the Trobriand Islands all the way to the Bismarcks, which explained the quiet.
    Despite the weather delay, Kenney had accurately guessed the enemy’s next target. On April 14, Yamamoto wore his dress whites again to send off the last attack of I-Go Sakusen . Seventy-five Zeros and twenty-three Vals from the Third Fleet, joined by fifty-four Zeros and forty-four Bettys of the Eleventh Air Fleet, took off to attack the harbor and airfields at Milne Bay. Several aircraft, including six Bettys, aborted along the way, but with almost two hundred aircraft involved, the attack force remained powerful.
    Once again, however, the Japanese effort fell short. Three Allied ships were hit by bombs at Milne Bay, with only one seriously damaged. None sank. Yet the Japanese crews that returned to Rabaul claimed three large transports and one medium transport sunk, six transports heavily damaged, and forty-four Allied planes shot down for certain. The Allies had launched exactly forty-four interceptors, nowhere near the hundred Kenney wanted, because of fog at Dobodura. Contrary to the Japanese claims, only one P-40 was lost, along with its pilot. Four other P-40s were damaged and a P-38 crash-landed. The defenders, meanwhile, claimed nineteen “confirmed” victories, about twice the actual Japanese losses, which amounted to five Bettys, three Vals, and at least one Zero.
    Among the Lightning pilots who claimed victories, Lt. Richard I. Bong of the 9th Fighter Squadron/49th Fighter Group was making a name for himself. Described by Kenney as “a little blonde-haired Norwegian boy,” Bong had already downed nine enemy aircraft before the clash over Milne Bay. But long before that, he had become another of Kenney’s “kids.” Accused of several flight violations in San Francisco, including a low-level pass down Market Street in a P-38, he had to stand at attention while Kenney chewed him out. Bong was the sort of fearless character favored by Kenney, who tore up the complaints. The instinct proved valid: Bong was a natural. During the combat over Milne Bay, he contributed to the downing of two Bettys. Although he received official credit for only one, the victory made him a double ace. Kenney advised his staff to “watch for that boy Bong.”
    AT RABAUL, YAMAMOTO and the Combined Fleet staff accepted the outrageous reports submitted by aircrews after the Milne Bay strike. Their claims were never openly challenged; instead, the Johokyoku (Information Bureau) in Tokyo approved the alleged details for publication. Japanese newspapers printed front-page headlines such as “Navy Eagles Achieve Fine Results,” accompanied by stories even more fictional than the airmen’s claims.
    Details of the April 12 attack, for example, were presented with great drama:
Over the airfield at Port Moresby, the enemy fliers avoided a clash with the Wild Eagles, knowing the power of the Nippon air force. Some of them, however, were left behind and were engaged in a battle by the Nippon Wild Eagles, with the result that 28 Grummans were shot down. Also, 10 large bombers and small aircraft parked on the field were destroyed by machine-gun fire.
The Nippon Wild Eagles moreover sank an enemy transport of 7,000 tons loaded with military supplies and fuel off the coast. Following this attack, other Nippon units blasted enemy military facilities to bits and rained bombs on 20 out of 40 enemy barracks on the eastern part of the airfield. The bombs burst with devastating effect, the