Free History of the Second World War by Basil Henry Liddell Hart

though they were not properly heeded. We know, too, that Canaris worked in mysterious ways, and was skilled in covering up his tracks. So the fateful accident of January 10 is bound to remain an open question.
    No such doubt surrounds the origination of the new plan. It forms another strange episode — though strange in a different way.
    The old plan, worked out by the General Staff under Halder, had been to make the main attack through central Belgium — as in 1914. It was to be carried out by Army Group ‘B’ under Bock, while Army Group ‘A’ under Rundstedt delivered a secondary attack, on the left, through the hilly and wooded Ardennes. No big results were expected here, and all the armoured divisions were allotted to Bock, as the General Staff regarded the Ardennes as far too difficult country for a tank drive.‡
     
    ‡ The French General Staff took exactly the same view. So had the British General Staff, When in November, 1933, I was consulted as to how our fast tank formations — which the War Office was just beginning to form — could best be used in a future war I had suggested that, in the event of a German invasion of France, we should deliver a tank counterstroke through the Ardennes. I was thereupon told that ‘the Ardennes were impassable to tanks’, to which I replied that, from personal study of the terrain, I regarded such a view as a delusion — as I had emphasised in several books between the wars.
     
    The Chief of Staff of Rundstedt’s Army Group was Erich von Manstein — regarded by his fellows as the ablest strategist among the younger generals. He felt that the first plan was too obvious, and too much a repetition of the Schlieffen plan of 1914 — so that it was just the kind of stroke for which the Allied High Command would be prepared. Another drawback, Manstein argued, was that it would meet the British Army, which was likely to be a tougher opponent than the French. Moreover, it would not lead to a decisive result. To quote his own words:
     
We could perhaps defeat the Allied forces in Belgium. We could conquer the Channel coast. But it was probable that our offensive would be definitely stopped on the Somme. Then there would grow up a situation like 1914 . . . there would be no chance of reaching a peace.*
     
    * Liddell Hart: The Other Side of the Hill, p. 152.
     
    Reflecting on the problem, Manstein had already conceived the bold solution of shifting the main stroke to the Ardennes, feeling that this would be the line of least expectation. But there was one big question in his mind, about which he had consulted Guderian in November 1939.
    Here is Guderian’s own account:
     
Manstein asked me if tank movements would be possible through the Ardennes in the direction of Sedan. He explained his plan of breaking through the extension of the Maginot Line near Sedan, in order to avoid the old-fashioned Schlieffen plan, familiar to the enemy and likely to be expected once more. I knew the terrain from World War I, and, after studying the map, confirmed his view. Manstein then convinced General von Rundstedt, and a memorandum was sent to O.K.H. [the Supreme Headquarters of the Army, headed by Brauchitsch and Halder]. O.K.H. refused to accept Manstein’s idea. But the latter succeeded in bringing his idea to Hitler’s knowledge.†
     
    † ibid, pp. 153-4.
     
    Warlimont brought Manstein’s idea to the notice of Hitler s headquarters, after a talk he had with Manstein in mid-December. He mentioned it to General Alfred Jodl, Chief of O.K.W. Operations Staff, who passed it on to Hitler. But it was only after the air accident of January 10, when Hitler was looking for a new plan, that Manstein’s proposal, thus brought back into his mind, began to get a hold. Even then a month passed before he swung definitely in favour of it.
    The final decision was clinched in a curious way. Brauchitsch and Halder had not liked the manner in which Manstein had pressed his ‘brain-wave’ in