Free Hitler's Lost Spy by Greg Clancy

espionage work is never without risk, and trust is never complete. In addition to operational risks, the spy constantly lives with the possibility of betrayal – a colleague who ‘turns’ and exposes the spy’s cover to the enemy. This prospect is not limited to other spies and their controllers. An example was Heinrich Cordes.
    Heinrich Cordes was born in Germany in 1912 and joined the Nazi party in 1933. He was later elevated through the SS to serve on German merchant ships as the Nazi political officer. In September 1937 he deserted his ship in Sydney and later commenced a small business producing liquid soap in the Sydney suburb of Five Dock. On the outbreak of World War II he unsuccessfully offered to provide information on Nazi activities in Australia to avoid internment. He did, however, offer assistance during his custody. His name is mentioned in Annette’s file as a possible source of information on her activities, but what he offered, if anything, is unknown. His case, however, is an example of the unpredictable and uncontrollable risks incurred by spies who may otherwise have established an unsuspecting record within the target community.
    There are other means by which a spy’s successful cover may be exposed, including carelessness. Annette Wagner’s associations with the hard-core Nazis in Sydney were seemingly very few, and only with those who Military Intelligence had reason to be concerned about. One of these was Rudolph Durkop, mentioned in a Military Intelligence memo dated 1 December 1939, following his internment:
Further to this office M.I.S. 1342 of 27 October 1939, Navy 7  now advise that the papers of Durkop referring to ‘the French girl Wagner’ were taken by the Police Squad in a raid on the night of third/fourth September  …
    Australia joined Britain in declaring war on Germany on 3 September, hence the raid on the active Nazi Durkop – Nazi party member 2599504 – and others that evening. How Annette’s name appeared in Durkop’s possession is not known, but it may be reasoned the two were together for at least one common interest. Durkop’s de facto, Helene Franze, entered in her diary for 5 April 1939 a visit to the cinema with four others. One of the four was recorded as ‘Wagner’. There is no certainty this was Annette; however, the name did not appear in her earlier diary entries for 1938 and 1939 listing friends and acquaintances. It is therefore highly feasible that this was, indeed, Annette.
    As Nazis, Durkop and Franze were fanatics. It is likely their entire spare time was filled with any opportunity to further the cause – and to do anything they were ordered.  Annette’s association with them, no matter how infrequent, would have been with this knowledge.
    Occasionally, however, conditions will exist that provide for a reduction of risk for the spy. One of these  ‘natural’ advantages is the individual prepared to spy on behalf of a foreign government, and is already securely in place prior to a declaration of war. The threat of exposure, as detailed above, remains, but the usual ‘spy initiations’ required to avoid suspicion are dispensed with. One of the ‘initiations’ dealt with is the obtaining of permanent residency in the target country.
    The ‘home-grown’ spy has immediate advantages over the spy ‘imported’. Language, cultural issues, employment and general community knowledge in his or her area of operations do not present the difficulties that may challenge new arrivals. The prime problem for the spy’s controllers is reliability. At what point will a citizen, living and working in the country of birth, decide to  ‘switch back’ and spill everything to authorities in that country?
    There are also possibilities resulting from migration.  A German who migrated, for example, to the United States during the 1930s did so for a