Free Hitler's Lost Spy by Greg Clancy Page B

talking peace to the world.
    Hitler’s manoeuvres in Europe may have created mixed responses, but the real national security anxieties in Australia in 1938 were focused in one direction only –  north – to the Japanese aggression in China, the extensive build-up of the Japanese navy, well in excess of defensive requirements, and the new commercially based Japanese spy operations in Southeast Asia and the South West Pacific. A European arrival in Australia, depending on origin and political circumstances, may have attracted some security attention, but the greatest potential menace was closer to home.
    Add to Annette’s background some personal charm and clever conversation when necessary, plus a few relapses from her admirably acquired typhoid fever, and the result in any security assessment is likely to have been a solid pass. She did not present any distinguishing features that would cause security alarm bells to ring.
    So Annette entered comfortably into the country of interest, but how did she rate with the Germans as a potentially reliable spy?
    In this evaluation, there are considerable gaps in our understanding of the lady. These gaps are the result of, firstly, the secret nature of espionage and, secondly, Annette’s capacity to be very good at what she was ordained to do. A sloppy spy may leave openings as to methods and trails of evidence, but a crafty spy, careful with operations, contacts and communications, may leave signs of evidence so minuscule they are almost non-detectible. So it was with Annette Wagner. Her exposure as a spy did not begin with suspicious behaviour from her operations – she was not ‘traced’ or entrapped. She was monitored by Military Intelligence, and it was only through intense observation, by various means, that the cracks in her deception came to light.
    The German assessment of Annette would have included the same process conducted by Australian authorities, had there been one, but in reverse.  Obviously, the Germans were satisfied with the results they obtained with whatever tests were applied. But this also introduces a further question we cannot answer.  Was Annette sourced and trained by a German intelligence agency before she arrived in Australia, or did her Nazi contacts in Australia do so after she arrived in March 1938? There is a distinct possibility that Annette arrived in Australia with the intentions she described, and nothing more. This unknown may be extended to include the possibility that Annette’s trip to Australia had not been arranged directly by a German intelligence branch. Perhaps she arrived on ‘recommendation’ from an unknown source. We will never know.
    There is yet another possibility – that Annette’s entry into radio broadcasting may have signalled her usefulness for dispatching coded messages via the most effective, and safest, form of secret communication available at that time. It is possible the Nazi spy network in Australia in 1938 made contact with Annette following the awareness of both the radio potential and her arrival from Madagascar where the administration had pro-Nazi leanings. Unfortunately, the records offering the answer to the question of Annette’s arrangement with Axis spying were probably destroyed prior to, or immediately following, the German surrender in May 1945.
    The Assimilation Project – Annette’s Star Performance
    Successful players in the espionage game endeavour to assimilate into a target community at a level devoid of suspicion. Spies need to blend in. ‘Differences’ need to be removed as far as possible as variations from the  ‘normal’ may initiate doubts, justified or not, that could lead to mistrust. In an era of international stress and suspicion, too many ‘differences’ may result in official enquiries and an unwelcome intrusion into the spy’s private world. Taking this further, an active rather than