made depending on how your mission goes. Remember, you are whoever you actually are, living a perfectly normal life in London, pursuing whatever it is you are pursuing.â
Blackford took the note papers, read them over, and returned them to Alistair.
âNow a general word on the British situation. On the whole, the British donât like American intelligence operations conducted in their country. I say on the whole,â because since the Klaus Fuchs affair, they have grudgingly admitted that we have certain information they donât have; or that, in any case, if only on account of the proddings of McCarthy, weâll act on certain information they canât, or wonât, act on. But they donât really want to know about it in any formal way. At the highest level, the P.M. is aware that weâre a presence. But anything we turn up, they want handed to them through diplomatic, not intelligence, channels. This embargo on any official contact between British and American intelligence in England is so rigid that when we need stuff they have that we are sure theyâd be willing to give us, we ask for it from Paris or directly from Washington. Never from London.
âNow,â he said, âthe situation in England is very grave. Fuchs stole atomic secrets and gave them to the Soviets. That was a considerable public scandal, and they tightened up security at the obvious levelsâatomic research plants, that kind of thing. But the Soviets have people everywhere. I mean everywhere . I mean, places you would never dream of. Recruiting by the Commies during the late thirties was very successful. And, during the war, there was the grand alliance. Now, in the Cold War, there is a surviving band of pro-Soviet Englishmen who think the West is on the wrong side of history. We know something about the general sources of Soviet intelligence, a lot about the actual information theyâre getting away with, and very little about who the people actually are. Their cover is superb. We are operating now mostly by deduction: Somebody, in this office, is leaking information. Who? Is that somebody a clerk-typist? A branch head? A division head? An Agency head? A spy? Or is he merely careless? We arenât in a position to check whether the Brits have their own man trying to penetrate an operation, and weâve even had a grotesque situation in which after fourteen months of diligent work, we fingered the guy we knew was guiltyâonly to discover he was a deep-cover British agent dogging the same trail. We blew his cover. That one required a long afternoonâs chat between Ache-son and the British ambassador.
âThe Soviets obviously have to be more cautious operating in London than they do in most places. But the purges back home have been flogging them on to tremendous effortsââ
âTremendous efforts to do what?â
Alistair looked at once disappointed and patient.
âThe Communists always have a lot to do. Right now they want to put pressure on Attlee to put pressure on Truman not to use the bomb in Korea. They wanted MacArthur fired. They want to get in the way of any moves toward European solidarity. They want to heighten English suspicion of French and German intentions. They want knowledge, on a day-by-day basis, of the disposition of NATO forces, with special emphasis on the location of atomic warheads. They want to know what kind of progress the Brits are making on the development of a tactical and a strategic missile. And they want every piece of dirt they can accumulate on anyone, just as a matter of course.
âAs I was saying, they have to watch their step in England, and they do. But when they get desperate, they act all the more ruthlessly. We had two men in the field missing this last year, no explanation, no record, no trace. The two had been on the trail of Klaus Fuchs. Both were deep-cover agents with satisfactory and plausible public identifications. We were