Free Defense of Hill 781 by James R. McDonough

and engineers had found the expected obstacle at CP 4. It took them ten minutes to reduce it, and in the process more than 50 percent of the engineer platoon was killed or wounded. The scouts who picked up the mission of clearing the enemy infantry in and around the obstacle also suffered heavily; thereafter, they lost their capacity to dismount. Once the obstacle was clear,the tanks and Bradleys under Carter could advance only with great care; dug-in infantry armed with antitank weapons guarded the slopes of both sides of the narrow valleys and had to be eliminated methodically before the armor could proceed. Without dismounted infantry this became an excruciatingly slow process. It was two hours before Objective BLUE was reached from that direction.
    In the center, Baker brought up the majority of his infantry, moving cautiously and without adequate fire support. The air force liaison officer, who had missed the orders passed by Always over the radio (throughout the fight he was alternately on and off the net), brought in an air strike about 0830 along what he still believed to be the main axis of advance from CP 2 to CP 3. He had heard the fighting from his position in the vicinity of Hill 826, which he had valiantly climbed under fire, but assumed that U.S. troops were buttoned up inside their armor-protected vehicles. This assumption cost Baker 20 percent of the remainder of his infantrymen, lost to friendly air, although it also inflicted heavy damage on the enemy infantry. By this time, with no armored threat along this approach, the enemy had shifted the majority of his tanks and BMPs back to Objective BLUE. Baker’s progress was slowed by his heavy casualties, but he pressed on to the objective, gradually linking up with Carter southeast of CP 3.
    The main attack of Alpha and Delta companies became a drawn-out battle through the pass south of Hill 785. Blinded by an approach that took them directly into the morning sun, the attackers suffered a major disadvantage. Nonetheless, aggressive tactics and good gunnery brought the exchange ratio about even. A major setback occurred, however, when enemy air struck at about 0900. In the confusion of the morning’s movements, the air defense platoon, which had never been directly attached to any specific company and, therefore, had failed to put its radios on any commander’s net save that of the task force, hadnot kept up with the forward elements of the attack. With the vehicle-mounted antiaircraft guns too far back, and with the missile teams killed in the dawn artillery barrage, the enemy air force had virtually free rein over the main attack. Only the Bradleys, with their superior tracking ability, were able to threaten the fast movers. But all they did was threaten, and five tanks and three Bradleys were destroyed before the enemy ran out of ammunition and pulled away.

    By 1000 Always’ task force had converged on the edges of Objective BLUE, driving back the enemy before its massed firepower. By this time only C Company was relatively intact. E Company was the next best off, but Always, in his confusion, had neglected to give explicit orders to Evans. He therefore elected to follow the main attack over Axis WHITE and through CP 1. Here the terrain restricted his ability to bring fire on the enemy’s armor. By the time he did deploy on Objective BLUE, the enemy had decided to make their escape to the northeast.
    By 1045 Always could report in to Brigade that he had taken Objective BLUE and was reconsolidating for a possible enemy counterattack. More than 50 percent of his combat vehicles and 80 percent of his infantry had been knocked out of action. His engineer platoon had been annihilated, and his scouts were in rough shape. A resolute counterattack would have been hard to defeat, and at the moment Always was hardly in a position to continue attacking. His medical support was severely overstretched, and two medic tracks had been knocked out in the fighting. Only