Free Afghanistan by David Isby Page A

government was weakening the support structure for them.
    Support for Sharia, however, does not necessarily translate into support for the Afghan insurgents or anti-democratic politics. There was widespread resentment, even from many Pushtuns, of the way the Taliban acted to implement Sharia law in 1994–2001. Yet the promise of social justice inherent in the concept of living under Sharia law is still seen favorably by many Afghans. Those that have offered social justice but failed to deliver—the post-1992 mujahideen-based government in Kabul, the pre-2001 Taliban, leaders who appeared more interested in earning money than helping their brethren—lose legitimacy and support.
    The failure of the current Afghan government to achieve social justice has made the insurgents’ offer to bring back Sharia law appealing to some Afghans. Afghan insurgents have used the appeal of social justice through Sharia to take advantage of the failure of the judicial system. The culture of corruption that has emerged throughout Afghanistan provides a further challenge and has focused resentment on the non-Muslim foreign presence that is widely seen as having created conditions that are the opposite of those inherent in Sharia.
    Institutions and Power
    Conflicts are about power. This makes the Afghan approach to power important—but not determinative—for understanding the institutions that shape the landscape of peoples and politics alike. Afghanistan hashistorically been a country where personal links and loyalty, more so than an individual’s skills or abilities, determine ultimate success and failure in society. Afghanistan started to move away from the patrimonial model in the nineteenth century when Abdur Rahman started to develop a state, though even the “iron amir” did not aim to centralize all Afghans or create a cohesive national infrastructure.
    The institutions of Afghan society are critical to the success or failure of any policy execution. These institutions are all-important for legitimating actions and decision-making undertaken by leadership or elite figures. A wide range of traditional Afghan institutions serve as interfaces between individual Afghans at the grassroots level and the official state. These include tribal, clan, or familial group leaders, especially among the tribally organized Pushtuns and, to a lesser extent, other groups including Uzbeks and Hazaras. Local councils of notables and elders, either ongoing or empaneled for a specific action, are shuras (Persian) and jirgas (Pushtu). While the two have been differentiated in that a shura is made up of elders and meets in response to a specific need, whereas a jirga is more egalitarian and meets on a consistent basis—which is why the Loya Jirga has become a national political structure, whereas the shura has not—in practice there is a wide variety of examples. 19 The hoqooq is a specialist shura dealing with land and water rights, a vital concern in agricultural areas. The possibility of a large-scale assembly for ratifying change is represented by Loya jirgas and similar assemblies. A darbar, an audience for expression of loyalty and redress of grievances, results when a leadership figure meets the grassroots; it is an important ritual and Afghan leadership figures that fail to carry it out lose legitimacy. Councils of clergy (ulema) have, in recent decades, been increasingly involved in these actions.
    A shura or jirga would draw on older, more experienced men, which in tribal areas would often be represented because of their hereditary authority. A shura may be more likely to include—or be dominated by—religious figures or local leaders that have not come out of traditional societal sources of authority. The 1978–2001 conflict saw shuras of guerilla commanders and religious leaders emerging to coordinate operations and fill the vacuum created by the lack of government; theseoften superseded traditional shuras and jirga. Religious institutions