Free Pain by Keith Wailoo

interpretation of the law.”
    38 . For “pain is an …,” see Rodgers, “Subjective Pain Testimony,” 198; for “if the regional courts …,” 198–99; for Senate bill discussion and dispute within government, see Pear, “Dispute Continues on Aid to Disabled.”
    39 . On patients like Polaski and their influence on health policy, particularly amid Reagan-era activism and calls for both fiscal restraint and patient’s rights, see Beatrix Hoffman, Nancy Tomes, Rachel Grob, and Mark Schlesinger, eds.,
Patients as Policy Actors
(New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2011); for “was not supported …,” see Polaski v. Heckler 751 F.2d 943 (8th Cir., 1984) Minnesota; for “directly and flagrantly,” as well as other details of the Polaski case, see Polaski v. Heckler, 585 F. Supp. 1004, 1013 (D. Minn., 1984); “Judge Orders Benefits Paid,”
Washington Post
, April 28, 1984, A12; “HHS Gets Order to Mail Disability Checks,”
Washington Post
, July 24, 1984, A13; Edward A. Gargan, “Delay in Restoring Benefits Said to Hurt Disabled,”
New York Times
, August 26, 1984, 42; for “state of lawlessness,” see “Judge Orders Benefits Paid,”
Washington Post
, April 28, 1984, A12; see also “HHS Gets Order to Mail Disability Checks,”
Washington Post
, July 24, 1984, A13; Edward A. Gargan, “Delay in Restoring Benefits said to Hurt Disabled,”
New York Times
, August 26, 1984, 42; on the temporary halt, see Polaski v. Heckler, No. 84-5085 (8th Cir., Dec. 31, 1984); for the case’s movement through the courts, see Civ. No. 4-84-64 (D. Minn., 4th Div., April 17, 1984); Polaski v. Heckler No. 84-5085, 751 F.2d 943, 8 Soc. Sec. Rep. Ser. 178, Unempl. Ins. Rep. CCH 15,666 (8th Cir., Dec. 31, 1984); Polaski v. Heckler, No. 4-84-64, 606 F. Supp. 549 (Dist. Ct., D. Minn., 4th Div., April 12, 1985); Heckler v. Polaski, No. 85-55 (U.S., October Term, 1985).
    40 . For “that will bring …,” see Shapiro and Rich, “Hill Alters Rules for Disability,” 1, 3; Congress and the administration both objected to the lack of uniformity across the courts in how disability was evaluated; see Kevin F. Foley, “Establishing Medically Determinable Impairments,”
Trial
(April 1, 1999); for “substantially limit …,” see Eileen Sweeney, “New Disability Legislation Enacted,”
Clearinghouse Review
18 (1984–1984): 819; on the pain question, the Institute of Medicine Report on pain and disability was published in 1987. MarianOsterweis, Arthur Kleinman, and David Mechanic, eds.,
Pain and Disability: Clinical, Behavioral, and Public Policy Perspectives
(Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1987); on the expert panel, see “Report of the Commission on the Evaluation of Pain,”
Social Security Bulletin
50 (January 1987): 13–44, www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v50n1/v50n1p13.pdf . See also Michael Ruppert, “Developments in Social Security Law,”
Indiana Law Review
22 (1988): 401; and Rodgers, “Subjective Pain Testimony,” 200.
    41 . On search for middle ground and polarization, see Rodgers, “Subjective Pain Testimony,” 192. In an effort to get beyond the conflicting court rulings on the status of pain, Congress in 1984 enacted a statute that included an express provision for evaluating pain: Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-460, § 3(a)(1), 98 Stat. 1794, 1799–1800 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A) (1988)); discussed in Ellen Smith Pryor, “Compensation and the Ineradicable Problems of Pain,”
George Washington Law Review
59 (January 1991): 239–306, 243.
    42 . Rodgers, “Subjective Pain Testimony,” 195; On administration’s upper hand, see Shapiro and Rich, “Hill Alters Rules for Disability,” A1.
    43 . Polaski v. Heckler, No. 84-5085 (8th Cir., Dec. 31,