Free For Honour's Sake by Mark Zuehlke Page A

service by Liverpool, who personally appointed him to replace Peel as the Colonial Department undersecretary. It was an attractive position that paid a handsome annual salary of £2,000, assuring financial security for as long as he held the post. 10 Goulburn was immediately impressed by Bathurst. As had been his inclination with Montagu, with the outgoing home secretary Richard Ryder, and with Perceval, Goulburn found in Bathurst a new father figure. That both men were staunch conservatives, who believed there was little chance for the improvement of the human race and that only institutions of social order suppressed its baser instincts, helped strengthen this almost immediate bond. Bathurst took a kindly interest in Goulburn and the younger man responded with intense loyalty.
    Goulburn and Peel worked briefly together to ensure a smooth transition within the department, and Peel was greatly impressed. “He approaches the nearest to perfection,” Peel later observed. 11
    The distinct division of authority Castlereagh had instituted and which Bathurst reinforced was such that Goulburn soon “knew no more of what was going on in the War branch than any stranger unless during the absence of my Colleague [Henry Bunbury].” 12 This was often enough the case as Bunbury’s health was poor, requiring frequent convalescing. Also, as Bathurst sat in the House of Lords it fell to Goulburn to be the spokesman for the ministry in the House of Commons, so he had to keep abreast of its entire operation. Consequently Goulburn became ratheran odd man out in the operational structure of the ministry, for he somewhat unwittingly was more fully informed and involved in its running than his superior likely intended.
    Bathurst’s preoccupation was the war with France, so he expected Goulburn to oversee most colonial affairs while he exercised only “the most general form of supervision.” 13 As such the twenty-eight-year-old was de facto head of the empire. And the most pressing colonial matter was the war with America.
    Goulburn gave scant credence to American justifications for the war. After examining President Madison’s war message and the causes cited in it, Goulburn dismissed them as mere camouflage. He believed Madison conspired with Napoleon Bonaparte—the two men, or at least their governments, having a secret understanding where each would work assiduously to bring about Britain’s defeat. The seizure of parts of Spanish West Florida and the massing of troops on the Canadian border preparatory to an invasion there confirmed that the true American intent was conquest and expansion of territory at the cost of Britain and her Spanish ally. Like many Britons, Goulburn considered the American declaration of war a “stab in the back” at a time when Britain was locked in a life-and-death struggle to prevent world domination by Napoleonic France. Taking advantage of Britain’s desperate straits, America sought to conquer all British North America. That was “the real object of the war on the part of the United States.” 14
    Initially the situation in Canada looked grim. Sir George Prevost complained in one report after another about the general air of defeatism pervading Upper Canada and the low militia turnouts. He also fretted about the French Canadians in Lower Canada and how they might turn against the British at any moment. Goulburn read all these reports closely. As was his custom with most of the vast volume of documents arriving from all points of the empire, his replies were concisely written on a turned-up corner. Occasionally he jotted “Put-by” in the corner and set it aside so he could take time to reflect upon its contents. Rarely did he pass reports up to Bathurst for input, fulfilling to the letter his minister’s expectation that he should on his own initiative handle matters responsibly and efficiently. LikeBathurst, he seldom used departmental