Free For Honour's Sake by Mark Zuehlke Page B

clerks to write responses, preferring instead to draft all dispatches in his own careful hand.
    Prevost’s pessimism grated on Goulburn and he worried about the man’s competency while doing what he could to bolster the ability of the army in Canada to defend itself. In August he managed to gather up clothing and equipment to send to Canada sufficient to meet the needs of 800 men and diverted one of two heavily laden supply ships bound for Iberia instead to North America. He also authorized Prevost to offer 100 acres of land to each colonist who enlisted in the army. At the same time he fretted that the obvious need to use Indian warriors to meet the American threat would lead to wanton and unnecessary bloodshed that might hamper attempts to negotiate a peace settlement. The solution, Goulburn thought, was “to prevent the commission of those excesses which are so much to be apprehended from their Employment” by having the warriors serve only under the immediate direction of experienced Indian Department officers. 15
    That the help he could send to Prevost was terribly scant was not lost on the young bureaucrat and, given that British forces in Canada were badly outnumbered by the Americans, Goulburn was not optimistic they could hold out. Then, on October 7, a special messenger banged on the door of his residence in the middle of the night. An anxious Goulburn clambered out of bed and hastily read the report so urgently delivered. With relief the undersecretary saw that rather than news of disaster the note announced the surrender of the U.S. western army and Detroit to Brock. His spirits were momentarily buoyed but almost as quickly deflated by the grim news that the Americans had handed the Royal Navy a string of stinging defeats. On the streets the news of Brock’s victory was received with joy, but Goulburn noted that the “feeling in the British public in favour of the Navy rendered in their eyes the military triumph no compensation for the naval disaster.” 16
    A maritime nation possessed of the largest navy in European history, Britain took great pride in her naval prowess, accepting as cant that she could never be bested on the seas. Throughout October and Novemberof 1812, however, the Admiralty received one report of defeat or failure after another that threatened to shatter this myth of invincibility.
    The first calamity had befallen the frigate HMS
Guerrière
on August 19 about 400 miles south of Newfoundland, when she was intercepted by the 55-gun
Constitution,
crewed by 460 sailors commanded by Capt. Isaac Hull, whose uncle was in the process of surrendering Detroit. Aboard
Guerrière,
Capt. James R. Dacres considered the two ships evenly matched despite his being undermanned with a crew of only about 280 men and mounting just forty-nine cannon. For an hour the two ships jockeyed for advantage, with
Guerrière
firing two ineffective broadsides while Hull concentrated on closing the range so he could fire with effect. When
Constitution
was 50 to 60 yards from the British ship, Hull, who had drilled his gunners to an unusually high state of competency, opened with a broadside that flung more than 700 pounds of iron out of the guns per volley. The British return fire hurled back 550 pounds but was far less accurate. Few hits were scored, while the American broadsides hammered home.
    A punishing duel ensued that left
Guerrière’s
hull holed in many places and her sails and rigging badly ripped. Fifteen minutes into the cannon exchange, the British mizzenmast suddenly collapsed, falling off the starboard quarter to hang into the sea. Hull immediately took advantage of Dacres’s inability to manoeuvre by swinging
Constitution
broadside to the British bow, from which only a few guns could be fired at the American ship, and raked
Guerrière
with heavy shot. Soon the fore and mainmasts crashed over the side and the ship rolled in the troughs so badly that seawater mixed