Free The Longest War by Peter L. Bergen

Author’s Note
 
    T he goal of this book is to tell a history of the “war on terror” in one volume. The organizing principle of this history is to examine not only the actions and strategies of the United States and its key allies, but also those of al-Qaeda and its allies, such as the Taliban. Most histories of the war on terror have been written largely from the American perspective, while this book folds into the narrative the perspective of al-Qaeda and allied jihadist groups. Just as histories of World War II told only from the point of view of Franklin Roosevelt would make little sense, so do we benefit from a better understanding of Osama bin Laden and his followers.
    This is not, of course, to suggest a moral equivalence between al-Qaeda and the United States. Yet as we look back it is clear that each side has made a set of symbiotic strategic errors that has helped the other. Luckily, those of the United States have not been as profound as al-Qaeda’s, although they certainly have been significant—from ceding the moral high ground with Guantánamo and coercive interrogations; to invading Iraq, which gave a new lease on life to the jihadist movement; to almost losing the Afghan War.
    Yet al-Qaeda has made even more profound strategic errors. The attack on September 11, 2001, itself caused the collapse of the Taliban regime and the destruction of al-Qaeda’s safe haven in Afghanistan, where it had once ruledwith impunity as a kind of shadow government within the Taliban regime. Later, in Iraq, al-Qaeda’s ruthless campaign of terror obliterated the support it had first enjoyed there, and so also severely damaged its “brand” around the Muslim world.
    This book is first a narrative history of the “war on terror,” based upon a synthesis of all the available open-source materials, together with my own interviewing and reporting during the course of more than a dozen visits to Afghanistan and Pakistan and other reporting trips to countries that have played a role in the narrative, such as Iraq, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Indonesia, Russia, Uzbekistan, the United Kingdom, and Italy. During those trips I have interviewed people from all sides of this war including: failed suicide bombers; leading Western counterterrorism and national security officials; members of the Taliban; the family and friends of Osama bin Laden; top American military officers; victims of American “extraordinary renditions” who have been taken by CIA officials to countries where they were then tortured; leading members of al-Qaeda, including bin Laden, and former militants who have turned against bin Laden’s terrorist organization.
    The book also aspires to provide an analytical net assessment of the “war on terror”: to see what conclusions might now be drawn about what al-Qaeda and its allied groups accomplished in the first decade of the twenty-first century and where the United States and her partners have succeeded and failed in their wars with the militants.
    Al-Qaeda and America face each other in a conflict in which no short-term resolution appears possible. Al-Qaeda’s
jihad
has failed to achieve its central aims. Bin Laden’s primary goal has always been regime change in the Middle East, sweeping away the governments from Cairo to Riyadh with Taliban-style rule. He wants Western troops and influence out of the region and believes that attacking the “far enemy,” the United States, will cause the U.S.-backed Arab regimes—the “near enemy”—to crumble. For all his leadership skills and charisma, however, bin Laden has accomplished the exact opposite of what he intended. A decade after the September 11 attacks, his last remaining safe havens in the Hindu Kush are under attack, and U.S. soldiers patrol Afghanistan and Iraq.
    Above all, this is a mark of the weakness of his leadership. Osama bin Laden has proved an inspiring figure to many in the global jihadist movement; but he has overreached, failed to