Free The End of Apartheid by Robin Renwick Page A

badly needed in the period ahead. He was not PW Botha’s favourite and would want to take over from him sooner rather than later. I also thought it easier for hawks than doves to make peace, once they were decided to do so. De Klerk was not Gorbachev, I reported, but we had a good relationship with him.
    At the opening of parliament, De Klerk had asked Helen Suzman why he was regarded as
verkramp
. ‘Because you never make a
verligte
speech’, was her reply. De Klerk proceeded, in his first statement as head of the National Party, to make a very
verligte
speech indeed, declaring that the aim must be to realise full civil rights for all South Africans and a democratic system in which no community was dominated by another or felt itself to be threatened or excluded.
3 February 1989
    I called on De Klerk in his office in parliament. He had said that he would be glad to see me at any time. There was going to be a difficult period ahead. Most of the ministers and National Party MPs hoped that the President would stand down. I said that PW Botha’s staff were telling me that he would not do so. He was resentful and suspicious of De Klerk. I passed on to De Klerk an invitation from the Prime Minister to an early meeting with her.
    Pik Botha, meanwhile, had been probing the government in London as to whether sanctions would be lifted if Mandela were released. The Prime Minister agreed that sanctions should be lifted only if Mandela’s release led into negotiations on a new constitution.
17 February 1989
    Further meeting with FW de Klerk. He told me that he did not know how things were going to work out with PW Botha. Rather than resigning, the President might well try to hold on for some time. He doubted if this could continue for many months – there had to be an election – but De Klerk could not go to London in the near term. He would do so later in the year. He had a high regard for the Prime Minister, and regarded the ties with Britain as the most important relationship South Africa had, as US policy was hamstrung by Congress. He had ideas about what needed to be done and plenty of authority within the party, but he was not yet in the driving seat. He realised that we wanted to see a new impetus for change.
    I said that, if he was able to take South Africa in a different direction, we would try to help him. But if the security police and military intelligence were allowed to continue their activities, including murder squads, unchecked, there was no way any of us were going to be able to help South Africa. We had evidence that, despite all the disclaimers, South African military intelligence were continuing to support Renamo in Mozambique. Other elements of the security forces were strongly suspected of murdering opponents of the regime.
    De Klerk told me that he heard what I was saying. He had never been involved in authorising these activities and was determined todeal with them. But, he added carefully, as I would understand, he would have to deal with the security forces with a velvet glove.
    De Klerk agreed on the importance of implementing the agreement leading to the independence of Namibia and not backtracking on any part of it. I said that the Prime Minister did not understand the government’s failure to engage more seriously with Buthelezi on constitutional issues. The key issue, however, was the release of Mandela. De Klerk said that he was not security-dominated in his thinking. But the situation had to be dealt with in a way that did not advance the cause of a revolution. I said that Mandela’s continued detention was being exploited by people who wanted to do just that. South Africa was now heading for an election, but Mandela’s release could not indefinitely be deferred.
23 February 1989
    Meeting with Barend du Plessis to tell him that the Prime Minister would like to see him when he was in London in April. He had been explaining to his cabinet colleagues that South