Free Why Leaders Lie by John J. Mearsheimer

Corps, 1914–1945
(London: Cassell, 1959), 1:3, 1:47, 1:53–56.
15 . Ken Alibek with Stephen Handelman,
Biohazard: The Chilling True Story of the Largest Covert Biological Weapons Program in the World, Told from the Inside by the Man Who Ran It
(New York: Dell, 2000); Jeanne Guillemin,
Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999); Matthew Meselson et al., “The Sverdlovsk Anthrax Outbreak of 1979,”
Science
, November 18, 1994, 1202–8; Judith Miller, Stephen Engelberg, and William Broad,
Germs: Biological Weapons and America’s Secret War
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001).
16 . Quoted in Bullock,
Hitler
, 329. See also ibid., chap. 6; Ian Kershaw,
The “Hitler Myth”: Image and Reality in the Third Reich
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), chap. 5; Ian Kershaw,
Hitler: 1889–1936; Hubris
(New York: Norton, 1999), chaps. 11–12; Ian Kershaw,
Hitler: 1936–45; Nemesis
(New York: Norton, 2000), chap. 1; Mihalka, “German Strategic Deception.”
17 . Quoted in Joachim C. Fest,
Hitler
, trans. Richard and Clara Winston (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1974), 556.
18 . Tsuyoshi Hasegawa,
Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005), 108. See also 33, 39, 46–47, 56, 86, 91–93, 190–91.
19 . Richard M. Nixon,
Six Crises
(Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1962), 353–57; James P. Pfiffner,
The Character Factor: How We Judge America’s Presidents
(College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 2004), 22, 24.
20 . Powell,
Other Side of the Story
, 225–32.
21 . Marc Trachtenberg,
A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), appendix 2, also available online at http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/
trachtenberg/appendices/appendixII.html
22 . Norman Rich,
Friedrich von Holstein, Politics and Diplomacy in the Era of Bismarck and Wilhelm II
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1965), 2:745. See also ibid., 2:678–745; David G. Herrmann,
The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996),chap. 2; Gerhard Ritter,
The Schlieffen Plan: Critique of a Myth
, trans. Andrew and Eva Wilson (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1979), 96–128; L. C. F. Turner,
Origins of the First World War
(New York: Norton, 1970), 2–5. It appears that the Moroccan Crisis is the only known case of a country making an empty verbal threat for coercive purposes. Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing,
Conflict among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977), 213–16.
23 . Bob Woodward, “Gadhafi Target of Secret U.S. Deception Plan,”
Washington Post
, October 2, 1986. See also Gerald M. Boyd, “The Administration Denies Planting Reports in the U.S.,”
New York Times
, October 3, 1986; Leslie H. Gelb, “Administration is Accused of Deceiving Press on Libya,”
New York Times
, October 3, 1986; Alex S. Jones, “Initial Report on Libyan Plots Stirred Skepticism,”
New York Times
, October 3, 1986; Jeffery T. Richelson, “Planning to Deceive: How the Defense Department Practices the Fine Art of Making Friends and Influencing People,”
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
59, no. 2 (March/April 2003): 67–68.
24 . After discussing the problems presented by strategic nuclear parity, Henry Kissinger writes, “The answer of our NATO friends to the situation I have described has invariably been to demand additional reassurances of an undiminished American military commitment. And I have sat around the NATO Council table in Brussels and elsewhere and have uttered the magic words which had a profoundly reassuring effect, and which permitted the Ministers to return home with a rationale for not increasing defense expenditures. And my successors have uttered the same reassurances and yet if