Free Why Leaders Lie by John J. Mearsheimer Page A

my analysis is correct these words cannot be true, and if my analysis is correct we must face the fact that it is absurd to base the strategy of the West on the credibility of the threat of mutual suicide.” “NATO: The Next Thirty Years,”
Atlantic Community Quarterly
17, no. 4 (Winter 1979/1980): 468. See also Dana H. Allin,
Cold War Illusions: America, Europe, and Soviet Power, 1969–1989
(New York: St. Martin’s, 1994), chap. 4; Robert S. McNamara, “The Military Role of Nuclear Weapons: Perceptions and Misperceptions,”
Foreign Affairs
, Fall 1983, 79.
25 . William Carr,
The Origins of the Wars of German Unification
(London: Longman, 1991), 144–203; F. Darmstaedter,
Bismarck and the Creation
of the Second Reich
(New York: Russell & Russell, 1965), 351–63; Lothar Gall,
Bismarck: The White Revolutionary
, trans. J. A. Underwood (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1986), 1:346–59; W. N. Medlicott,
Bismarck and Modern Germany
(New York: Harper & Row, 1968), 78–84; Otto Pflanze,
Bismarck and the Development of Germany: The Period of Unification, 1815–1871
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973), chap. 18.
26 . Barbara Demick, “‘Intelligence Fiasco’ Stirs Up the Korean Peninsula,”
Los Angeles Times
, March 24, 2005; Dafna Linzer, “U.S. Misled Allies about Nuclear Export,”
Washington Post
, March 20, 2005.
27 . Dwight D. Eisenhower,
Waging Peace, 1956–1961: The White House Years
(Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1965), 546. See also James Bamford,
Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency; From the Cold War through the Dawn of a New Century
(New York: Doubleday, 2001); Michael R. Beschloss,
MAYDAY: Eisenhower, Khrushchev and the U-2 Affair
(New York: Harper & Row, 1986); Ted Galen Carpenter,
The Captive Press: Foreign Policy Crises and the First Amendment
(Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 1995), 55–56; David Wise and Thomas B. Ross,
The U-2 Affair
(New York: Random House, 1962).
28 . Quoted in Benny Morris,
Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881–1999
(New York: Knopf, 1999), 281–82. See also Joel Beinin,
The Dispersion Of Egyptian Jewry: Culture, Politics, And The Formation Of A Modern Diaspora
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 19–20, 31–32, 90–117; Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman,
Every Spy a Prince: The Complete History of Israel’s Intelligence Community
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1990), 54–61; Livia Rokach,
Israel’s Sacred Terrorism: A Study Based on Moshe Sharett’s Personal Diary and Other Documents
, 2 nd ed. (Belmont, MA: Association of Arab-American University Graduates, 1982), 38–42; Shabtai Teveth,
Ben-Gurion’s Spy: The Story of the Political Scandal That Shaped Modern Israel
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).
29 . Quoted in Anthony Cave Brown,
Bodyguard of Lies
(New York: Harper & Row, 1975), 10. See also Thaddeus Holt,
The Deceivers: Allied Military Deception in the Second World War
(New York: Skyhorse, 2007); Phillip Knightley,
The First Casualty: From the Crimea to Vietnam; The War Correspondent as Hero, Propagandist, andMyth Maker
(New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975); Michael Howard,
Strategic Deception in the Second World War
(New York: Norton, 1995); Harold D. Lasswell,
Propaganda Technique in the World War
(New York: Knopf, 1927); J. C. Masterman,
The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939 to 1945
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1972); Arthur Ponsonby,
Falsehood in War-Time, Containing an Assortment of Lies Circulated throughout the Nations during the Great War
(New York: Dutton, 1928); Evelin Sullivan,
The Concise Book of Lying
(New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2001), 229–53.
30 . Quoted in Warren F. Kimball,
The Juggler: Franklin Roosevelt as Wartime Statesman
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), 7.
31 . It is important to note that militaries place a high premium on truth telling within the organization, because it is an essential ingredient of success in