Free What Stalin Knew by David E. Murphy

richest capitalist countries (espe-
    cially England) were shaken.’’ Or this: ‘‘The position of Communists in
    power is different from the position of Communists in the opposition. We
    are the masters in our own house. Communists . . . in the opposition are in
    the opposition; there the bourgeoisie is master. We can maneuver, pit one
    side against the other to set them fighting with each other as fiercely as
    possible.’’ In the remainder of his comments Stalin laid out the reasons for
    abandoning the Popular Front, explained why he decided not to continue
    negotiations with the French and English, and outlined the slogans to
    guide the working class in their fight against ‘‘the bosses of capitalist
    countries . . . waging war for their own imperialist interests.’’ In September
    1939 Stalin could not foresee how quickly Hitler would overrun Western
    Europe, but he clung to his view that Germany would not attack the USSR
    in 1941 and never abandoned his hope that Hitler would deal with En-
    gland first before launching such an attack.10
    As late as May 5, 1941, there were still echoes, in a speech Stalin gave
    to the graduates of military academies, of his fascination with Lenin’s view
    of war as the midwife to revolution. In the wake of the speech, the Red
    28
    PROSKUROV SETS STALIN STRAIGHT
    Army’s Chief Directorate for Political Propaganda began work on a new
    Red Army Political Handbook ( Krasnoarmeiski Polituchebnik ). This hand-
    book contained the following statements:
    If, as a result of war, a situation arises in some countries whereby
    a revolutionary crisis ripens and the power of the bourgeoisie is
    weakened, the USSR will go to war against capitalism, to the aid of
    proletarian revolution. Lenin said, ‘‘As soon as we are strong enough
    to crush capitalism, we will immediately grab it by the scruff of
    the neck.’’
    If the USSR had gone along with England and France, there is
    no doubt that the German military machine would have been turned
    against the Soviet Union.
    The possibility is not excluded that the USSR, in situations
    that might develop, will take the initiative of offensive military
    operations.
    The new handbook was reviewed by members of the Main Military
    Council on June 10, 1941, and these paragraphs (from pages 149, 152, and
    155) were excised.11
    On September 17, 1939, the Red Army began the occupation of the
    western regions of Belorussia and Ukraine. The impact of these and other
    territorial acquisitions will be examined in the next chapter.
    ∂
    C H A P T E R
    Soviet Borders Move
    Westward
    Historians have largely subscribed to the theory
    that by recovering the borderlands lost to Russia after World War I and
    moving Soviet frontiers westward, the USSR improved its defensive pos-
    ture. This was not entirely true. By incorporating parts of Romania and
    Poland into the Ukrainian, Belorussian, and Moldavian union republics
    and absorbing the Baltic States, Soviet security and military forces had to
    contend with intensely hostile populations. Ukrainian and Belorussian
    nationalists aided German intelligence in espionage operations before
    June 1941 and served as saboteurs in the early hours and days of the
    war, destroying Red Army communications and other facilities. So did the
    Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians (most of the military units of those
    states integrated into the Red Army were found to be quite unreliable). On
    the purely military side, the Red Army did not have time to complete new
    defensive positions in the new territories before June 22, and suggestions
    to Stalin that the defensive structures along the old border be manned
    were rejected. The restoration of areas that had been traditionally Russian
    was seen by Stalin as enhancing Soviet prestige and expanding the fron-
    tiers of socialism. He had little patience with professional Red Army of-
    ficers such as Boris M. Shaposhnikov, chief of the general staff, who fore-
    saw problems in