Free What Stalin Knew by David E. Murphy Page A

defending these newly acquired areas. He was content to
    let Beria and his minions deal harshly with their anti-Soviet populations.
    The speed of the German advance into Poland allegedly took Stalin
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    SOVIET BORDERS MOVE WESTWARD
    by surprise and it was not until September 17, 1939, that he released a
    statement blaming the Poles for leaving defenseless ‘‘its kindred Ukrainian
    and Belorussian people’’ and announcing the Red Army’s entry into Po-

land. Actually, extensive preparations had been made earlier. Therefore
    Soviet forces, together with special NKVD units, had begun advancing at
    5:40 a.m. that day on two fronts formed from the Belorussian and Kiev
    Special Military Districts. The Belorussian Front under General Mikhail P.
    Kovalev, composed of four armies, moved rapidly against little resistance.
    By September 28 it was able to organize elections to a People’s Assembly
    that on November 2 voted to become part of the Belorussian SSR.1
    Ukrainian areas were occupied by the Ukrainian Front under Semen K.
    Timoshenko. The Front had a force of the Fifth, Sixth, and Twelfth armies,
    containing a total of eight infantry corps, three cavalry corps, plus a tank
    corps and five tank brigades. Each army created a special mobile force
    from tank and cavalry units in order to reach the demarcation line in the
    shortest possible time.2 Stalin was taking no chances: even though he had
    Hitler’s agreement on the territory to be occupied, the Soviet assistant
    military attaché in Berlin had earlier reported a different plan. This at-
    taché had been shown a Wehrmacht map placing the line east of Lvov
    and Drogobych, an oil-producing area much coveted by the Germans.3 It
    should have been expected, therefore, that when forward elements of the
    Sixth Army arrived in the Lvov area on September 19, the Germans were
    already approaching the city from the west. A firefight had ensued, result-
    ing in casualties on both sides and the loss of equipment.4 Incidentally, the
    Sixth Army was commanded by Filipp I. Golikov, the ‘‘politically correct’’
    corps commander who in 1938 had been the political member of the Mili-
    tary Council of the Belorussian Military District and in 1940 would be-
    come the head of Soviet military intelligence.5 By mid-October, elections
    to a People’s Assembly were held, paralleling the procedure in Belorussia.
    By October 27 the assembly, sitting in Lvov, voted to become part of the
    Ukrainian SSR and the union was accepted on November 15, 1939. Glow-
    ing reports were received in Moscow describing the happiness of the west-
    ern Ukrainians at joining the Soviet family. This one from Lev Z. Mekhlis,
    chief of the Political Directorate of the Red Army, was typical: ‘‘The Ukrai-
    nian population is meeting our army as true liberators. . . . As a rule, even
    advance units are being met by entire populations coming out onto the
    streets. Many weep with joy.’’ The youth of Drogobych said ‘‘their hearts
    were filled with deep love for the great Soviet people, the Red Army, and
    the Ukrainian Communist Party.’’6 These first reactions on the part of west-
    SOVIET BORDERS MOVE WESTWARD
    31
    ern Ukrainians reflected their dislike of the Poles, who had governed them
    since 1919, and their lack of experience with either the tsarist or the Soviet
    government. They had, after all, been part of the Austro-Hungarian Em-
    pire from the first partition of Poland in 1772 to the end of World War I.
    The Soviet security forces had a more realistic view of the difficulties
    they would encounter when the Belorussian and Ukrainian populations of
    Poland were brought under Soviet control. On September 1, 1939, soon
    after the Germans launched their attack on Poland, they began to plan for
    a massive NKVD presence in the new territories. A week later, NKVD chief
    Beria issued orders to Ivan S. Serov and Lavrenti F. Tsanava, the heads of
    the NKVD in the Ukrainian and Belorussian SSRs, to create