Free What Stalin Knew by David E. Murphy Page B

special Chek-
    ist groups composed of operational and political workers from their own
    staffs and from the border troop districts in their republics. Personnel
    for these groups, approximately 500 officers, were also to be taken from
    temporary assignments in the Leningrad NKVD Directorate and from the
    central NKVD staff. Arrangements were made for assigning these groups
    to army units in accordance with plans of the defense commissar. Serov
    was directed to coordinate his activities with Ukrainian Communist Party
    Secretary Nikita S. Khrushchev and with Ukrainian Front Commander
    Semen K. Timoshenko. In Belorussia the same pattern was to have been
    followed. Every day at 6:00 p.m. Serov and Tsanava were to report by tele-
    graph on their progress. The deputy chief of the USSR NKVD for troops,
    Ivan I. Maslennikov, was to place personnel of the Ukrainian and Belorus-
    sian border troop districts at the disposal of the chiefs of the operational
    Chekist groups; these troops were to be formed into battalions, one per
    group, to carry out special tasks. Sergei N. Kruglov, NKVD deputy com-
    missar, was directed to form a reserve group of 300 taken from the local
    organs of the NKVD and to compile a list of the selected persons by Sep-
    tember 10. Beria concluded by ordering Vsevolod N. Merkulov, his first
    deputy, to the Ukrainian SSR to supervise operations there, and Viktor M.
    Bochkov, chief of NKVD Special Departments, to Belorussia. By the next
    day, Serov responded, noting that the required personnel were either on
    hand or en route; the First and Second operational groups were already
    being provided by agreement with the Kiev Special Military District. Serov
    added that he was in regular contact with Khrushchev and Timoshenko.
    From these communications one can see how quickly and efficiently the
    NKVD functioned to create the administrative structure to support mili-
    tary operations in the new territories.7
    On September 15, two days before the Red Army made its move, Beria
    32
    SOVIET BORDERS MOVE WESTWARD
    sent a directive to Serov and Tsanava explaining how and what was to be
    done as Soviet forces entered former Polish territory. When Soviet troops
    occupied a town, a temporary civil administration including leaders of the
    NKVD operational groups was to be created. Working in close contact with
    the military and under the leadership of the temporary civil administra-
    tions, NKVD operatives would maintain public order, eliminate sabotage,
    suppress counterrevolution, and form the nucleus of future NKVD offices
    for the area. Here are some of their specific tasks:
    Immediately seize all communications facilities—that is, telephone,
    telegraph, radio stations, post offices—and place trusted persons
    in charge. Seize all private and government banks and treasury
    branches, impound all funds, and arrange for their safekeeping.
    Extend all possible cooperation to political departments of the
    Red Army in seizing printing presses, newspaper editorial offices,
    and newsprint warehouses and start up new newspapers. Also seize
    all government archives, particularly those of the intelligence and
    counterintelligence services of the former Polish government.
    Arrest the more reactionary representatives of the former gov-
    ernment, such as local police officers, members of the gendarmerie,
    border police, military intelligence officers, etc. Also arrest leaders
    and active members of counterrevolutionary political parties and
    organizations. Also occupy the jails, check the backgrounds of pris-
    oners. Release those with records of resistance to the Polish govern-
    ment, establish a new prison system staffed by reliable people and
    headed by an NKVD operative.
    In addition to the above measures, the NKVD component of the ad-
    ministration was to deal with criminal matters and establish a reliable fire
    department. Its main concern, however, was the detection and elimination
    of espionage and terror, as well as sabotage,