course to go in first with a torpedo attack with his cruisers and destroyers, sacrificing them if necessary to cripple the battleships and open a path for his battlecruisers to exploit. He had six heavy cruisers available (the seventh, the Mikuma, was having her torpedo damage patched up in Saigon harbour ready to return to Japan for proper repairs), as well as fourteen destroyers. He would keep six of his destroyers back to protect his capital ships against possible submarine attack (both British and Dutch submarines were known to be operating in the South China Sea), and the rest would go in with the cruisers to attack with torpedoes. It was his intention to steer southwest during the night; even if, as he thought possible, the British retired west that would put him into a reasonable position to attack. He would send off a strike from his carriers (as well as one from land) as soon as the British had been located, and that should finish off their remaining carrier, allowing him to track them without opposition and arrange his attack to his advantage. While the casualties to the afternoon raid had been high, he had been informed that additional G4M Bettys were available, which with the planes from his two carriers should be ample - with two carriers out of action, the number of defending fighters would be severely limited. In order to maximize the chance of locating Force Z, he would also use the cover of night to advance his cruisers and spread them out in a search line ahead of his main group.
Somerville on the other hand had no intention of reversing course yet - his intention was to so damage the Japanese force that they would be too weak to protect the convoys bringing troops and supplies into Siam, and ideally sink the entire force. He was still closing, and at 2200 was some 220 miles away as he launched his radar planes in a search pattern to locate the Japanese ships. At 2315, one of the SeaLance reported multiple contacts of large ships, the pattern and speed indicating it was Kondo's force. Orders were given to launch the strike already armed and spotted on the flight decks of the three carriers.
Battle of the South China Sea (the night strike)
At midnight, a full strike was launched into the tropical night by Force Z's three carriers. They had made a number of course changes under cover of darkness, in order to try and evade the Japanese - Somerville was worried that they might have informed submarines in the area where they were (they had, but in fact there were none close enough to intercept a fleet advancing at 18 knots). As soon as her planes had been flown off, HMAS Melbourne turned to head southwest, accompanied by the cruiser HMAS Hobart and two destroyers. The rest of the force would meet up with her at daylight.
Further reports of the contact had been coming in while the strike launched, and in addition to the main body already discovered, another plane had reported a single contact some distance in front of it. The best analysis suggested this was one of (probably a number) of cruisers or destroyers out in front of the main body as a screen. Assuming a normal layout for such a screen, although Kondo's main force was some 180 miles away, it was possible a cruiser could be no more than 50 miles away. Accordingly the remaining search aircraft were ordered to search the area any closer ships would be in, and the force reorganized itself to put the battleships and some of the cruisers on the side of the most likely surface threat, just in case of unwelcome surprises.
While these precautionary measures were being put in place the air strike was approaching Kondo's main body. In addition to the two carriers and two battlecruisers, he had retained the heavy cruisers Mogami and Suzuya as well as eight destroyers as antisubmarine escorts to allow him a secondary striking force in case the unexpected happened. They were also ready to move to support one of the screening cruisers
The Science of Leonardo: Inside the Mind of the Great Genius of the Renaissance