certainly got access to funds and he associates with some known negative elements. There are cocaine pipelines running up from the towns all along the coast into the northern stretches of the Timbuktu zone. They are all operated by Colombian cartels that have bought their way into the region and tried to buy almost every army general in West Africa. It’s possible Idrissa is in their pocket.”
“Not good,” said Judd shaking his head.
“Heroin is also a problem. The Taliban in Afghanistan run opium into the tribal zones of Pakistan, convert it into heroin, then find ways to transit the drugs into Europe through weak states. A recent influx of Pakistani traders into northern Mali might signal that heroin has arrived here, too.”
“And that would mean direct involvement in financing attacksagainst American forces in Afghanistan and the Middle East,” added Zoe.
“The Taliban? Really?” asked Judd. “There’s an Afghan heroin connection to Mali?”
“It would represent a major escalation. But there are some markers. We just don’t know the scale.”
“So, is this Idrissa’s secret income source?” asked Judd. “Today’s coup maker is running drugs for Colombian cartels or maybe even the Taliban?”
“It’s all circumstantial at this stage. Right now, we have no direct intel. We just don’t have many resources dedicated to this part of the world.”
“Is Mali cooperating on counternarcotics? What about their annual scorecard for the McCall Kingpin Amendment?”
“Inconclusive. So far they’ve only gotten green lights.”
“Which means what exactly?”
“Not much. McCall’s vetting is based on embassy reporting, not empirical data.”
“I see.”
“It’s not just drugs, Dr. Ryker. Idrissa is from a small village about an hour’s drive from Bandiagara. His home area along the border with Burkina Faso is a favorite transit point for smugglers. We have a report from a European intelligence source that Viktor Chelenkov is using that route. We know Chelenkov has been running light weaponry to insurgents in Chad and Niger. There could be a connection to Idrissa, but we don’t have it yet.”
“Chelenkov, the Russian arms dealer arrested in Dubai last year?”
“The very one. He’s awaiting extradition to the international court in The Hague for war crimes.”
“Since when have there been Russians involved in Mali?” asked Judd, aware that he was probably showing too much unease.
A young female analyst took her cue. “Russian activity has accelerated recently. There is also a geology team from Moscow in-country right now. They told the Malians they are conducting early-stage seismic studies. Supposedly hunting for oil in the zone between Kidal and Timbuktu. The station reports that the equipment patterns are more consistent with mining than oil. We suspect the oil team may be a cover for uranium exploration.”
Judd raised his eyebrows in an expression of worry.
“Uranium?”
“Yes, sir. It’s a possibility.”
“Okay, so you say Idrissa has been building up power internally and probably building a war chest for himself and the junta, possibly funded by links to Russian mafia or mining companies.”
“Or drugs,” she added.
“Right. Or drugs,” responded Judd, revealing his growing annoyance. “So, whatever the income source, why does Idrissa move now against Maiga? Was Maiga about to clamp down on him or threaten his business?”
“That’s plausible,” said Sunday.
Judd turned to Zoe. “What motivates Idrissa?”
She nodded to another analyst, who took the cue and began, “General Idrissa is clearly ambitious, and rose quickly through the ranks of the military. He headed Zone Six around Timbuktu for many years but was passed over as Chief of Staff twice, whichwe know was a source of anger. We believe that’s when he started building a separate power base. Maiga appears to have recognized this and promoted him to army Chief of Staff only a few months ago.