Free The Village by Bing West

weapon was firing at Lam, and even after he went down the four Viet Cong converged over his body and stood shooting the corpse. Then, for good measure, they dropped two grenades next to Lam’s body and ran out the back door. The blasts knocked out one wall and collapsed part of the roof. Lam’s body was totally mangled.
    When the police and Marines arrived, neighbors had already dragged Lam’s stunned mother from the wreckage. In deep shock and grief, she could tell them nothing. But the villagers said the killers had bicycled toward My Hué. It took an hour to gather a large enough force to enter that hamlet, and when the angry police did push in, hoping that someone would fire at them, all they met were frightened villagers who claimed the four men had crossed the river to the safety of the VC stronghold called the Phu Longs.
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    The next day, in an impressive ceremony, the villagers buried Lam in the cemetery near the fort. Beebe missed the funeral. He was flying home. With Lam dead and Beebe gone, only Phuoc remained as the symbol of leadership within the combined unit, and he had no interest in military matters. The district chief was considering withdrawing the unit before more men were killed and the villagers who attended Lam’s funeral were plainly frightened. The Viet Cong were claiming victory. Within a week they had killed three times. They had butchered the strongest man in the combined unit in his own house. It was obvious who held the initiative.
    Before he left for the airport, Corporal Beebe had given his commanding officer an end-of-tour report. It read in part:
    On June 10th, 1966 one squad of Marines from Company C, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines were picked to join the Popular Forces unit at Binh Yen Noi. It is obvious to those who have initiated and followed the PF program that it has been a success. Since the Marines have begun their instructions, the confidence and skill of the PFs have risen considerably. The PFs are now a well-organized efficient combat unit. This program has also strengthened the relationship between the Marines and the PFs and civilians in the area. The effect of this has been the strengthening of the defensive posture of the area.
    R OBERT A. B EEBE
    CPL USMC
    The Viet Cong had a problem. In a war in which events were rarely significant in and of themselves, what counted were the perceptions of people about those events. The villagers and the PFs who knew the history of Binh Nghia could clearly see the power of the Viet Cong manifested in the deaths of Khoi, Page and Lam.
    Not so the Marines. Ignorant of that history and of the nature of the war, volunteers for the Marine Corps and for Vietnam, veterans of dozens of firefights, volunteers for the village, it never occurred to them to view the blows as the brink of defeat. They were saddened and shaken by their losses, but, not knowing the past, they did not view the events as a prelude to the future. There is no evidence that at the end of June the Marines shared the Vietnamese view of the situation in the village.

Book II
Night Patrols

6
    Sergeant Joseph Sullivan replaced Beebe as squad leader. A tall, proud man who had been promised a promotion if he performed well in the village, Sullivan fitted the stereotype image of the Marine NCO. He was strict, single-minded and dauntless. He was sure of himself and of his duties.
    â€œThe reason,” he said, “most of the Marines volunteered to come down here—well, not most of them—all of them—is the excitement. And you have a sense of independence down here. There’s no harassment and no paperwork. You’re always in contact with the Viet Cong. You know you have a job to do. You go out at night and you do it.”
    Sullivan attributed the troubles at the fort to a lack of tactical aggressiveness and insisted that the unit carry the fight to the enemy. Instead of trying to defend the Binh Yen Noi complex of hamlets, the PFs and Marines had