the same lines: âTwo or more units, either individuals or groups, engaged in pursuing the same rewards, with these rewards so defined that if they are attained by one unit, there are fewer rewards for the other units in the situationâ (
Aggression: A Social Psychological Analysis,
p. 178).
10. Karen Horney,
The Neurotic Personality of Our Time, p
. 160.
11. Robert N. Bellah et al.,
Habits of the Heart,
p. 198.
12. Bertrand Russell,
The Conquest of Happiness,
p. 45.
Â
CHAPTER 2
Â
1. For a good discussion of the Burt phenomenon, including speculation as to why so many have been so eager to accept his conclusions, see R. C. Lewontin et al.,
Not in Our Genes,
chapter 5.
2. An outstanding and wide-ranging critique of biological determinism is contained in
Not in Our Genes,
by R. C. Lewontin, a highly respected evolutionary geneticist; Steven Rose, a neurobiologist; and Leon J. Kamin, a psychologist. They explore such issues as schizophrenia, gender-based differences, and intelligence, concluding, âThe only sensible thing to say about human nature is that it is âinâ that nature to construct its own historyâ (p. 14). Stephen Jay Gould also put it well: âWhy imagine that specific genes for aggression, dominance, or spite have any importance when we know that the brainâs enormous flexibility permits us to be aggressive or peaceful, dominant or submissive, spiteful or generous? Violence, sexism, and general nastiness
are
biological since they represent one subset of a possible range of behaviors. But peacefulness, equality, and kindness áre just as biologicalâand we may see their influence increase if we can create social structures that permit them to flourishâ (âBiological Potential vs. Biological Determinism,â p. 349). Also see Gouldâs essay, âThe Nonscience of Human Nature.â
3. Richard Dawkins,
The Selfish Gene,
p. ix.
4. Konrad Lorenz, of course, attempted to do just this. Some of the best critical essays on his work and that of such other naturalists as Robert Ardrey are contained in
Man and Aggression,
edited by Ashley Montagu. Aggression, naturally, is of special interest to us here because of its relationship to competition (see chapter 6).
5. This is usually formulated by ethical theorists as âought implies can,â and was articulated by Immanuel Kant: âDuty demands nothing of us which we cannot do. . . . When the moral law commands that we
ought
to be better men, it follows inevitably that we must
be able
to be better menâ (
Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone,
pp. 43, 46).
6. Leslie H. Farber, âMerchandising Depression,â p. 64.
7. See, for example, âThe Grand Inquisitorâ chapter of Dostoyevskyâs
Brothers Karamazov,
Erich Frommâs
Escape from Freedom,
and almost anything by Sören Kierkegaard or Jean-Paul Sartre.
8. Roger Caillois,
Man, Play and Games,
p. 55.
9. John Harvey et al.,
Competition: A Study in Human Motive,
p. 12.
10. James S. Coleman,
The Adolescent Society,
p. 318; his emphasis.
11. Harvey Ruben,
Competing,
p. ix.
12. Ibid., p. 22.
13. Ibid., p. 20.
14. Ibid., p. 39; his emphasis.
15. The tendency to construe apparently friendly acts as hostile has been found to be one of the signal differences between normal and disturbed populations (Harold L. Raush, âInteraction Sequences,â p. 498).
16. Harold J. Vanderzwaag,
Toward a Philosophy of Sport,
p. 127.
17. Mary Ann OâRoark, ââCompetitionâ Isnât a Dirty Word,â p. 66.
18. Garrett Hardin,
Promethean Ethics: Living with Death, Competition, and Triage,
p. 36.
19. There are certain areas of thought from whose contributions we are sometimes asked to
infer
the conclusion that competition is inevitable. These include the study of other species, which is the subject of the next section; and two currents within psychologyâpsychoanalysis and social comparison